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Monetary Growth and Business Cycles 
Part II: The Relationship Between 
Monetary Decelerations and Recessions 
By Bryon Higgins 
A major policy issue confronting the Federal 
Reserve in recent years has been how to reduce 
the rate of  monetary growth, and thereby ease 
inflationary pressures, without incurring undue 
risk  of  recession.  In  this  regard,  G.  William 
Miller, Chairman of the Board of Governors of 
the  Federal  Reserve  System,  has  pointed  out 
that  "any  deceleration  in  monetary  growth 
rates has to be undertaken with caution" if  a 
recession is to be averted.' 
Such  caution  is  warranted  because  of  the 
historical  relationship  between  monetary 
growth  and  business  cycles.  Based  on  this 
historical relationship, some analysts have 
concluded  that  the  recent  slowdown  in 
monetary  growth  is  similar  to  the  monetary 
decelerations  that  typically  accompany  reces- 
sions. This conclusion appears to be consistent 
with  the  monetary  theory  of  business  cycles, 
which  implies  that  there  is  a  one-to-one 
relationship  between  "significant"  decelera- 
tions  in  monetary  growth  and  recessions.' 
However,  while  monetary  decelerations  have 
been  associated  with  recessions  in  the United 
States  for  over  a  century,  there  has  been 
considerable  variation  in  the  magnitude  and 
timing  of  declines  in  the  rate  of  monetary 
growth in the vicinity of recessions. Analysis of 
Statement  before  the  Committee  on  Banking,  Housing 
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, April 25, 1978. 
the  implication  of  monetary  deceleration  for 
recession, therefore, requires detailed examina- 
tion  of  the characteristics  of  the current  and 
past decelerations. 
This article examines the historical relation- 
ship  between  monetary  growth  and  business 
cycles  since  1952  and  develops  a  method  for 
measuring the degree of  monetary deceleration 
that has been  associated  with  recessions.  The 
first section presents a preliminary overview of 
the  linkage  between  monetary  decelerations 
and  recessions  since  1952.  A  method  for 
determining  the degree  of  monetary  decelera- 
tion is presented in the second  section.  In the 
third section, this method  is  used  to evaluate 
the  extent  to  which  historical  evidence  since 
1952 is consistent with the view  that there is a 
one-to-one  relationship between  monetary 
deceleration  and  recessions.  The final  section 
analyzes the degree of monetary deceleration in 
recent months and  the possibility of  recession 
The  meaning  of  "significant"  decelerations  in  this 
context  is  intended to indicate in a  general  way  that the 
monetary  decelerations  under  consideration  are  major, 
meaningful declines in the rate of monetary growth likely to 
have  a  substantial  impact  on  other  economic  variables. 
Thus, the term "significant" deceleration is merely used for 
expositional  convenience  in  this  article  to  distinguish 
between  alternative  magnitudes  of  declines  in  monetary 
growth  rather  than  to  indicate  that  the  classification  of 
monetary  decelerations  is  based  on  formal  rules  of 
statistical  inference. 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City under alternative assumptions about the rate of 
monetary growth over the next year. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MONETARY DECELERATIONS AND 
RECESSIONS: 1952-77 
The  monetary  theory  of  business  cycles 
implies that there is  a one-to-one  relationship 
between recessions and "significant" decelera- 
tions in monetary growth. This theory implies, 
in  other  words,  that  historical  experience  is 
consistent with the following two propositions:' 
1)  recessions are always  accom- 
panied  by  a "significant" decel- 
eration in monetary growth; and 
2) "significant"  decelerations in 
monetary  growth  are  always 
accompanied by recessions. 
The  first  proposition  states  that  recessions 
never  occur  in  the  absence  of  "significant" 
deceleration  in  monetary  growth,  while  the 
second  proposition  states  that  "significant" 
decelerations  never  occur  in  the  absence  of 
recessions. 
The pattern of monetary growth since 1952 is 
generally  consistent  with  the  view  that 
recessions are always accompanied by "signifi- 
cant" decelerations in  monetary  growth.4 The 
3 Historical experience consistent  with these two  proposi- 
tions can be considered verification of  the monetary theory 
of business cycles only in the sense that one cannot reject 
this theory on the basis of  empirical evidence. It is possible , 
that the same historical evidence could  be consistent  with 
alternative  theories  in  which  money  has  little  or  no 
independent influence on  the economy. See, for example, 
James Tobin, "Money and Income: Post Hoc Ergo Propter 
Hoc?"  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  Vol.  27,  No,  2, 
May 1970. 
The year 1952 was chosen as the beginning of the period 
to  be  analyzed  primarily  because  it  appears  that  the 
Federal  Reserve-Treasury  Accord  in  1951  changed  the 
cyclical  pattern  of  monetary  growth.  See  "Monetary 
Growth and Business Cycles, Part I: . . . ." 
relationship between monetary deceleration and 
recession is depicted in Charts 1 and 2 for the 
period from 1952 to the present. Chart 1 shows 
the quarterly growth rate of nominal and real, 
or price-adjusted, values  of  the  narrowly 
defined money supply, MI, which is composed  . 
of  currency  and demand deposits held  by  the 
nonbank publi~.~  Chart 2 shows the quarterly 
growth rate of  nominal  and  real values of  the 
more broadly defined money supply, M2, which 
includes  M1  plus  most  time  and  savings 
deposits at commercial banks. The charts show 
that  each  of  the  five  recessions  since  1952, 
which are shown on the charts by shaded areas, 
have been accompanied by a substantial decline 
in  the  quarterly  growth  rates  of  each  of  the 
monetary measures. 
The historical evidence since 1952, however, 
does  not  seem  to  support  the  view  that 
5 Growth  rates were  computed  by  taking the  percentage 
changes in  the quarterly averages of  monthly data on the 
various monetary aggregates.  The real  values of  M1  and 
M2  were  found  by  dividing  M1  and  M2  values  by 
the consumer  price  index.  Reported  values  of  M1  since 
November 1978 were adjusted to include a  portion  of  the 
funds in automatic transfer accounts. This adjustment was 
made so  that the recent  M1  data  would  be  more  nearly 
comparable  with  M1  data  before  the  introduction  of 
automatic transfers. 
The behavior of real M1 and real M2 are included in the 
analysis primarily because of the important role assigned to 
the  real  money  supply  in  some  economic  theories.  In 
addition, growth in real M2 is one of the components of  the 
index of  leading economic  indicators  constructed  by  the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
6 The definition and timing of  recessions provided by  the 
National Bureau of  Economic Research (NBER) is adopted 
in  this study.  The NBER  identifies  a  recession when  the 
behavior of  a  variety  of  economic  variables  indicates  a 
prolonged  and  pervasive  decline  in  aggregate  economic 
activity.  There  have  been  several  instances  in  the  period 
since  1952  when  there  were  pronounced  reductions  in 
economic  growth  not  severe  enough  to  be  classified  as 
recessions  by  the  NBER.  The  economic  slowdown  in 
1966-67  is  classified  by  some  analysts  as a "mini 
recession." There is no attempt in  this study to analyze the 
relationship between monetary decelerations and economic 
slowdowns other than those classified as recessions by  the 
NBER. 
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"significant" monetary  deceleration  is  always 
accompanied by a recession. There were several 
instances between 1952 and 1978 when declines 
in  the  quarterly  growth  rates  of  the  various 
monetary measures were not associated  with  a 
recession.  Moreover,  the characteristics  of  at 
least  one  of  these  decelerations,  that  in 
1966-67, were similar in  many  respects  to the 
decelerations that were  associated  with  reces- 
sions-i.e.,  the  growth  rates  of  all  four 
monetary  measures declined  substantially  and 
the declines persisted for several quarters. 
The  occurrence  of  monetary  decelerations 
that are  not  accompanied  by  recessions  casts 
doubt  on  the validity  of  the  proposition  that 
"significant" monetary decelerations are always 
accompanied  by  recessions.  However,  conclu- 
sions regarding the validity of  this proposition 
require  a  precise  measure  of  the  degree  of 
monetary  deceleration.  The  quarterly  growth 
rates shown in Charts 1 and  2  are inadequate 
for  this  purpose  because  the variability  in  the 
magnitude and timing of declines in these rates 
makes it difficult to determine which  monetary 
decelerations should be classified as significant. 
A  better  measure  of  the degree  of  monetary 
deceleration  is  developed  in  the  following 
section. 
MEASURING THE DEGREE OF 
MONETARY DECELERATION 
A  useful measure of the degree of  monetary 
deceleration should have several characteristics. 
First,  it  should  be  insensitive  to  temporary 
aberrations in monetary growth rates.'  Second, 
it  should  incorporate the  effects  of  both  the 
duration  and  the  sharpness  of  declining 
monetary  growth  rates.  This  is  because  the 
* 
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impact  of  monetary  deceleration  on  the 
economy  may  depend  both  on  the  sharpness 
and  the  duration  of  decelerating  monetary 
growth.  Finally,  a  measure  of  the  degree  of 
monetary  deceleration  should  provide  useful 
information  for  monetary  policy  analysis  and 
decisions. 
The  volatility  of  short-run  growth  rates  may  be  less 
important  than  longer  run  trends  when  analyzing  the 
impact  of  monetary  growth  on  the  economy  for  two 
reasons. First, some of the short-run variability in monetary 
growth rates may  be spurious in  the sense that it  results 
from  errors  in  measuring  and  seasonally  adjusting  the 
underlying data.  Second,  independent  evidence  suggests 
that  short-run  variability  in  monetary  growth  has  little 
impact on the course of  the economy. See, for example, E. 
Gerald  Corrigan, "Income  Stabilization  and  Short-Run 
Variability of  Money," Federal Resetve Bank of New  York 
Monthly Review. April 1973. 
Poole's Procedure for Measuring the 
Degree of  Monetary Deceleration 
A procedure developed by William  Poole for 
measuring the degree of monetary deceleration 
fulfills two of  the three desirable criteria listed 
abo~e.~  Poole's  procedure  is  based  on 
comparison  of  the  actual  level  of  the  money 
supply with the level that would have resulted if 
monetary  growth  had  continued  at  an 
established trend rate. Because the comparison 
is based on levels of the money supply, it allows 
for  the  cumulative  impact  of  declining 
monetary growth. The trend  rate of  monetary 
8 William  Poole,  "The  Relationship  of  Monetary 
Decelerations to Business Cycle Peaks: Another Look at the 
Evidence,"  Journal of Finance. Vol. 30, No. 3, June 1975. 
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and  extrapolated  several  months  ahead, 
thereby  minimizing  the  effects  of  temporary 
variations in monetary growth on the estimated 
degree of  monetary decelerati~n.~ 
Poole's  procedure  does  not  provide  useful 
information for the conduct of monetary policy, 
however. Poole used the peak rate of  monetary 
growth in the economic expansion preceding a 
recession to define the trend rate that serves as 
the  basis  of  comparison  for  the  subsequent 
deceleration.  This  method  for  defining  trends 
implies that monetary growth cannot fall below 
the  highest  growth  rate  previously  attained, 
except  for  a  brief  period,  without  being 
associated  with  a  recession.  Thus,  Poole's 
procedure  for  identifying  the  degree  of 
monetary deceleration implies that any attempt 
by  the  Federal  Reserve  to lower  the  rate  of 
monetary growth below the peak trend rate will 
inevitably result in a recession. 
An Alternative for Measuring the Degree 
of  Monetary Deceleration 
The  procedure  proposed  by  Poole  for 
determining  the degree  of  monetary decelera- 
tion can be amended to fulfill  all three of  the 
desirable criteria  outlined  above.  The  method 
used  in  this  study  for  defining  monetary 
deceleration  is,  like  Poole's,  based  on 
9  Poole inferred the two-year trend growth rates of  M1 and 
M2 in a given month from regressions of the logarithms of 
M1  and  M2  on  time over  the current and  preceding  24 
months. The trend growth rate estimated  in  this way  was 
extrapolated from  the  average  level  of  the money  supply 
over the period defining the maximum  trend growth  rate. 
Comparison  of  the  actual  levels of  the  money  supply  in 
subsequent  months  to  the  levels  corresponding  to  the 
extrapolated peak trend growth rate led Poole to conclude 
that there was nearly a one-to-one relationship between the 
timing of  business  cycle  peaks  and  significant  monetary 
decelerations,  which  were  defined  as  the  money  stock 
falling below its maximum 24-month growth trend by 3 to 4 
per cent. 
comparison  of  the  actual  level  of  the  money 
supply to the level that would  have resulted if 
monetary  growth  had  continued  at  an 
established trend rate.I0 However, in this study, 
unlike the Poole study, the trend rate is defined 
as the annualized growth rate over the two-year 
period  ending  one  year  before  the  date  in 
question.ll  This  trend  growth  rate  is  then 
extrapolated 12 months ahead to determine the 
hypothetical  level  of  the  money  supply  that 
would  have resulted  from  continuation of  the 
two-year  trend  growth  rate for  an additional 
year.'= 
The ratio  of  the actual level  of  the  money 
supply,  symbolized  by  (A),  to  the  level,  (E), 
corresponding to the extrapolated  trend growth 
rate  is  the  measure  of  monetary  deceleration 
used in this study. This A/E  ratio for  a given 
month measures the degree to which  monetary 
growth  over  the  year  ending  in  that  month 
exceeded or fell short of monetary growth in the 
preceding two-year period." For example,  the 
A/E  ratio for M2  in  December  1978 was  .980. 
10 Unlike  Poole's  study,  the  consistency  of  timing 
relationships between monetary decelerations  and business 
cycle  peaks was not  used in  this study  as a  criterion for 
judging  alternative  methods  of  measuring  the degree  of 
monetary decelerations.  It has been shown that evidence on 
the timing relationship between monetary decelerations and 
recessions does not indicate conclusively whether money has 
a  significant  independent  influence  on  the economy.  See 
James Tobin, "Money and Income: . . . ." 
11 Growth  rates were computed  by  taking the changes in 
the logarithms of three-month moving averages centered on 
the month in auestion. 
A/E  ratios, defined  subsequently, were also  computed 
for five-year trend growth rates extrapolated 6, 12, and 24 
months  ahead  and  for  two-year  trend  growth  rates 
extrapolated 6 and  24  months ahead. The two-year trend 
extrapolated  12  months  ahead  was  chosen  because  it 
produced the most consistent  results. 
l3  The  A/E ratios  computed  in  this  way  are  equal  to 
(1  + RA)/(l  +  RT), where  RA is  the rate of  monetary 
growth in the year preceding the month in question and RT 
is the corresponding  two-year  trend  growth  rate.  Indeed, 
any analysis based on alternative levels of  the money supply 
can  be recast in terms of the corresponding growth rates. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City The value of  A used  to compute this  ratio is 
$875.3 billion, which was the actual level of the 
money  supply  in  December  1978.14 The 
corresponding  value  of  E  is  $893.4  billion, 
which  is  the  hypothetical  level  of  M2 
in  December 1978 that would  have resulted  if 
the  9.8  per  cent  M2  growth  rate  from 
December  1975  to  December  1977  had 
continued  for  an  additional  year.  Thus,  the 
A/E  ratio  of  .980  is  equal  to  $875.3 
billion/$893.4  billion. 
Deceleration  of  monetary  growth  always 
yields  an  A/E  ratio  less  than  one.  In  other 
words, the actual level, A, of the money supply 
is only a fraction of what it would have been, E, 
if the two-year trend rate had continued for an 
additional  year.  Moreover,  the  A/E  ratio  is 
below one by an amount that is proportional to 
the degree of the associated decline in monetary 
growth. Thus, it is possible to rank the degree 
of  monetary  deceleration  by  the  numerical 
value of the corresponding A/E ratios. 
The  use  of  A/E  ratios  to  analyze  the 
relationship  between  monetary  growth  and 
business  cycles is  similar  in  many  respects to 
the  procedures  employed  by  Friedman  and 
Schwartz  and  by  Poole.Is  One  of  the  weak- 
l4  This  is  an  average  of  the  M2  levels  in  November, 
December,  and  January.  All  of  the  A/E  ratios  were 
computed using three-month  centered moving averages for 
the A values. 
15 Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, "Money 
and Business Cycles," Review of Economics and Statistics. 
February  1963;  and  William  Poole,  "The  Relationship 
. . .,"  loc.  cit.  There  are,  of  course,  numerous  other 
procedures  that  could  be  employed  to  analyze  the 
relationship between monetary deceleration and recessions. 
For example, a  structural  or  single-equation  econometric 
model  of  the  economy  could  be  employed  to  infer  the 
effects of monetary  deceleration  on other economic 
variables.  See  Bryon  Higgins  and  V.  Vance  Roley, 
"Monetary  Policy  and  Economic  Performance:  Evidence 
from Single  Equation  Models," Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Kansas  City  Economic  Review,  January  1979,  for  a 
discussion  of  the  potential  usefulness  of various types  of 
econometric  models  to evaluate  the  effects  of  monetary 
growth on the economy. 
nesses of this approach is the inherent difficulty 
in  formulating empirical  tests  to validate  the 
results,  which  are  based  solely  on  observed 
historical  relationships  between  two  variables 
and  do not  reflect  any  formal  theory  of  the 
linkage between those variables. Because of this 
lack  of  statistical  basis,  the  degree  of 
confidence  in  the  results  cannot  be  precisely 
specified.  Thus,  the inferences  based  on  this 
type of  analysis must be interpreted with care. 
Nevertheless, the A/E ratios employed  in  this 
study do serve as a useful measure of the degree 
of  monetary  deceleration  and  thereby  allow 
analysis of  the relationship  between  monetary 
growth and business cycles. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MONETARY DECELERATIONS AND 
RECESSION: 1952-77 
Charts 3 and 4 show the A/E ratios for real 
and  nominal  values  of  M1 and  M2  for  the 
period since 1952. The general cyclical pattern 
of  the  A/E  ratios  conforms  closely  to  the 
cyclical pattern of  quarterly rates of  monetary 
growth, rising during economic expansions and 
declining in the vicinity of recessions. The A/E 
ratios for all four monetary measures fell below 
one in the vicinity of each of the five recessions 
since 1952,  which  are shown  in  the charts by 
shaded areas. 
The  A/E  ratios  can  be  used  to determine 
whether  there  is  a  one-to-one  relationship 
between  "significant"  monetary  decelerations 
and recessions. Such a one-to-one  relationship 
would  hold if there is some degree of  monetary 
deceleration-which  may  be  defined  as  a 
"significant" deceleration-that always accom- 
panies recessions and if  this same "significant" 
degree  of  monetary  deceleration  is  always 
accompanied  by  a  recession.  The  degree  of 
monetary deceleration can be measured by the 
values  of  the  corresponding  A/E  ratios-the 
lower are the A/E ratios, the more pronounced 
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is  the associated  monetary deceleration.  Thus, 
the degree of  monetary deceleration in  various 
periods  can  be  ranked  according  to  the 
minimum  values  of  the  A/E  ratios  that 
occurred in those periods. For example, Charts 3 
and 4 show that the most pronounced monetary 
deceleration since 1952 occurred in 1969-70. In 
the 1969-70 period, the A/E ratio for M1 fell to 
.960 and the A/E ratio for M2 fell to .930, both of 
which  were lower than in  any  other  period  of 
monetary deceleration from 1952 to 1977. 
Analysis of the A/E ratios from 1952 to 1977 
does not support the proposition that there is a 
one-to-one  relationship  between  "significant" 
monetary  decelerations  and  recessions.  Since 
1952,  no  particular  degree  of  monetary 
deceleration has always accompanied and been 
accompanied  by  a  recession.  As  measured  by 
the minimum A/E ratios for  M1 and  M2, for 
example,  the degree  of  monetary  deceleration 
AIE  AIE 
1.10  1.10 
1 .oo  1  .oo 
was  more  pronounced  in  1966-67  than  in 
1956-58, although the 1966-67 deceleration was 
not  accompanied  by  a  recession  and  the 
1956-58  deceleration  was  accompanied  by  a 
recession.  The  historical  evidence  indicates, 
therefore,  that  the  same  degree  of  monetary 
deceleration that is accompanied by a recession 
in one instance may not be accompanied  by a 
recession  in  another  instance.  As  a  conse- 
quence,  there  is  not  a  one-to-one  correspon- 
dence  between  recessions  and  any  particular 
degree of monetary deceleration. 
Although  there  is  not  a  perfect  correspon- 
dence  between  recessions  and  the  degree  of 
monetary deceleration, historical evidence 
indicates  that  a  fairly  close  relationship  has 
existed  between  recessions  and  the  degree  of 
monetary  deceleration  since  1952.  This  rela- 
tionship  can  be  analyzed  by  identifying  the 
characteristics of different degrees of  monetary 
.90 
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deceleration.  Monetary  deceleration  may  be 
characterized  as  mild,  appreciable,  or severe, 
depending  on  the  minimum  value  of  the 
corresponding A/E ratios.16 
Mild  deceleration  in  monetary  growth  is 
characterized by minimum A/E ratios between 
.99 and 1.00 for one or more of  the monetary 
measures.  The  four  mild  decelerations  in 
16 The classification scheme used to distinguish alternative 
degrees  of  monetary  deceleration  is  used  only  for 
expositional  convenience  in  describing  the  relationship 
between  monetary  deceleration  and  recessions.  Economic 
theory and more  formal  empirical  tests indicate that  the 
relationship between monetary growth and other economic 
variables is "continuous" in the sense that slightly greater 
declines in  monetary growth have slightly larger effects on 
the economy. To some extent, therefore, the discreet cutoff 
points  used  to  classify  alternative  degrees  of  monetary 
deceleration  are artificial.  For descriptive  purposes, 
however, it is useful to categorize the different  degrees of 
monetary deceleration by  the minimum A/E ratios. 
AIE 
1.10 
monetary  growth  between  1952  and  1977 
occurred  in  1962-63,  1964,  1965,  and  1976. 
(See Table 1.) Since recessions did not occur in 
any of  these  periods,  mild  monetary  decelera- 
tion  has  never  been  accompanied  by  a 
recession. 
Appreciable deceleration in monetary growth 
is  characterized  by  minimum  A/E ratios  that 
fall predominantly in the following ranges:" 
1)  .962 to .990 for MI, 
2)  .964 to .990 for M2, 
3)  .944 to .990 for real MI, and 
4)  .942 to .990 for real M2. 
The four appreciable decelerations in monetary 
growth  in  the  period  from  1952  to  1977 
17 The basis for these ranges is explained in footnote 18. 
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1%6-67. The first three of  these decelerations 
were  associated  with  recessions  but  the 
deceleration  in  1966-67  was  not.  Thus, 
appreciable  deceleration  in  monetary  growth 
has  sometimes,  although  not  always,  been 
accompanied by  recessions. 
Severe  deceleration  in  monetary  growth  is 
characterized  by two or more of the A/E ratios 
below  the  following  critical  values-.962  for 
MI, .964 for  M2,  .944 for real  MI, and  .942 
for real M2.I8 Because the two severe monetary 
decelerations  since  1952,  which  occurred  in 
1969-70 and 1973-75, were both associated with 
recessions,  severe  deceleration  and  monetary 
growth  has  always  been  accompanied  by  a 
recession. 
In  summary,  the  historical  evidence  since 
1952  does  not  indicate  that  there  is  a 
one-to-one relationship between  recessions and 
any particular degree of monetary deceleration. 
There  is  no  degree  of  monetary  deceleration 
l8 The  definition  of  severe  monetary  deceleration  is 
intended to reflect only those declines in monetary growth 
that were significantly  more severe  than  that in  1966-67. 
Since the deceleration in 1966-67 was not accompanied by a 
recession, it is important to differentiate clearly the degree 
of deceleration in 1966-67 from the degree that is consistent 
with the view that some degree of  monetary deceleration  is 
always  associated  with  a  recession.  In  determining  the 
differential between A/E ratios that is significant enough to 
justify a distinction between alternative degrees of monetary 
deceleration,  it  is  important  to  take  account  of  the 
magnitude of variability in the A/E ratios over time, which 
is  an  indication  of  the  statistical  error  likely  to  be 
associated with calculations based on  the A/E  ratios.  For 
this purpose, the standard deviation of the A/E ratios from 
1952-78 was  used  to  distinguish  monetary  decelerations 
that are significantly different  in  degree from the 1966-67 
deceleration. Specifically the cutoff values (SDi) of the A/E 
ratios that distinguish  appreciable  from  severe  monetary 
decelerations  were  computed  for each  monetary  measure 
as: 
SDi  = (A/E)? - .5(Ui) 
where  is  the minimum value of the A/E ratio for the 
i-th monetary measure in the 1966-67 period, and Ui  is the 
standard deviation in  the A/E ratio for the i-th  monetary 
measure in the period since 1952. 
Table 1 
MEASURES OF THE DEGREE 
OF MONETARY DECELERATION 
Periods of  M~n~rnurn  AIE Rat~os  For: 
Monetary  Real  Real 
Deceleration  MI  M2  M  1  ---  M  2  - 
1953-54"  .965  .979  ,970  .984 
1956-58"  ,978  .980t  ,984  .958 
1960-61 *  .965  .952  ,966  .953 
1962-63  .996  -  ,996  - 
1964  -  .999  -  .996 
1965  ,998  -  .993  - 
1966-67  ,971  .976  .960  .961 
1969-70"  .960  .930  .940  .912 
1973.75"  ,968  .972  .923  .924 
1976  ,995  -  - 
'Monetary  decelerations  that  were  associated 
with a recession. 
tThe period of deceleration  in M2 growth ended 
before  the  beginning  of  the  recession  in 
September 1957,  and the minimum AIE ratio  for 
M2 occurred in June 1956.  Because  deceleration 
in  the  growth  of  all  of  the  other  monetary 
measures continued into the recession,  however, 
it is reasonable to interpret the deceleration of M2 
growth  in  1956  as  being  associated  with  the 
subsequent recession. 
*Minimum  AIE  ratios  are  reported  only  for 
monetary  measures  whose  growth rates  decele- 
rated in the period. 
that  has  always  both  accompanied  and  been 
accompanied  by  recessions.  In  this  sense, 
historical  evidence  does  not  support  the 
monetary theory  of  business  cycles.  Historical 
evidence  does  indicate,  however,  that  the 
likelihood of recession increases with the degree 
of  monetary  deceleration.  In  the period  from 
1952 to 1977,  mild  decelerations  in  monetary 
growth were never accompanied  by  recessions, 
appreciable  decelerations were  sometimes 
accompanied by recessions, and severe deceler- 
ations were always accompanied  by recessions. 
Thus, historical evidence supports the view  that 
there  is  a  definite  relationship  between 
monetary deceleration and recession. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City THE CURRENT DECELERATION IN 
MONETARY GROWTH 
Monetary growth has slowed substantially in 
recent  months,  leading  some  analysts  to 
question whether the current economic  expan- 
sion will continue through the end of  the year. 
The annualized  growth  rate of  M1 in  the six 
months ending in February  1979  was  1.0  per 
cent, compared with a high of 8.7 per cent in the 
six months ending in September 1978. Part of 
the rapid decline in M1 growth in the past few 
months  reflects  shifts out of  demand  deposits 
into automatic transfer  accounts,  which  were 
introduced  in  November  1978.19 These  shifts 
make comparisons of  the current deceleration 
of  M1  growth  with  previous  decelerations 
somewhat  misleading.  In  the  analysis  that 
follows, therefore, the MI  growth rates used for 
the period since November 1978 were computed 
by  estimating the path of  M1 that would  have 
occurred in  the absence of  automatic transfer 
acc~u.nts.~O  On this basis, M1 has grown at an 
annual  rate  of  2.3  per  cent  in  the  last  six 
months,  still  down  substantially  from  the 
relatively high growth  rates of 1978. Similarly, 
the growth rate of M2 in the past six  months, 
which is  assumed not  to have been  influenced 
by the existence of automatic transfer accounts, 
For  an  analysis of  the  impact  of  automatic  transfer 
accounts  on  monetary  growth,  see  Scott  Winningham, 
"Automatic  Transfers  and  Monetary  Policy,"  Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City ~conomic  ~evi&,  November 
1978. 
20 It was assumed that one-half  of  all funds in  automatic 
transfer accounts were transferred from demand deposits. 
On  this basis  the following amounts  were  added  to  the 
monthly levels of  M1 to adjust for the impact of automatic 
transfers: (adjustment in billions of dollars) Nov.  1978, 0.7; 
Dec. 1978, 1.5; Jan. 1979, 2.1; Feb. 1979, 2.5; Mar. 1979, 
2.9. For a more complete analysis of the sources of funds in 
automatic  transfer  accounts,  see  Bank  Administration 
Institute, Automatic  Transfer  Service,  Nov.  1.  1978-Dec. 
15, 1978-A Research Summary. February 1979. 
was 4.6 per cent, compared with a peak rate of 
11.7  per  cent  for  the  six  months  ending  in 
January 1977. The deceleration in M1 and M2 
growth  rates,  combined  with  continued  high 
inflation, has resulted in absolute declines in real 
M1 and real M2. 
Several observers have argued that the recent 
deceleration  in  monetary growth  is  similar to 
decelerations  that  have  been  associated  with 
recessions in  the past.  To determine  whether 
this conclusion is warranted, the characteristics 
of the current decline in  monetary growth  are 
analyzed  within  the  framework  developed  in 
preceding sections. 
Analysis  of  the  A/E  ratios  for  real  and 
nominal values  of  M1 and  M2 indicates  that 
the  current  degree  of  monetary  deceleration 
should  be  characterized  as  appreciable.  The 
current values of  the A/E ratios are well below 
the level characterizing  mild monetary deceler- 
ation, which has never  been  associated  with a 
recession  since  1952,  although  not  yet  low 
enough  to  indicate  a  severe  monetary 
deceleration,  which  has  always  been  accom- 
panied  by  a  reces~ion.~'  Thus,  the  current 
degree  of  monetary  deceleration  is  in  the 
intermediate  range  that  has  sometimes, 
although  not  always,  been  accompanied  by  a 
recession. 
Continued sluggishness in monetary growth, 
however, would result in further declines in the 
A/E  ratios  and  would  place  the  current 
monetary  deceleration  in  the  severe  category 
that  has  always  been  accompanied  by 
recessions  in  the  period  since  1952.  Table  2 
shows  the  minimum  A/E  ratios  in  the 
upcoming  year-from  February  1979  to 
February  1980-that  would  result  from  alter- 
21 The values of the A/E ratios in February 1979 were: .986 
for MI, .975 for M2, .953 for real MI, and .942 for real M2. 
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THE PROSPECTIVE DEGREE 
OF MONETARY DECELERATION 
Alternative  Minimum  A/E Ratios From 
MI  and M2  February 1979 to February 1980 for: 
Growth 
Rates in  Real  Real 
Per Cent  MI*  -  M2  -  MI *  M  2  - - 
4  .95 1  .945  ,938  .932 
5  ,957  .951  .943  .937 
6  .963  .957  .948  .94 2 t 
7  .968  .962  .953  .942t 
8  .973  .967  .953t  .942t 
9  .978  .972  .953t  .942t 
'The  AIE ratios do not reflect  any adjustment  to 
growth  rates  of  real  and  nominal  MI  to  take 
account  of  the  effects  of  automatic  transfer 
accounts. 
tlndicates that the minimum occurs before  April 
1979.  - 
native M1 and M2 growth  rates.22  The figures 
in  the table suggest that an MI growth  rate of 
more than 5 per cent-less  an adjustment  to 
account  for  the  effects  of  automatic  transfer 
accounts  on  the  growth  of  MI-and  an  M2 
growth  rate of  more than 7 per cent  over  the 
period  from  February 1979  to February  1980 
would  be  required  to  prevent  the  current 
decline  in  monetary growth  from  becoming  a 
severe  monetary  deceleration." Lower  mone- 
tary  growth  rates  would  lead  to  A/E  ratios 
22 The hypothetical levels  of  real  M1 and  real  M2 were 
computed  under the assumption  that the consumer  price 
index increases at a steady annual rate of 8.4  per cent from 
February 1979 to March 1980. 
23 It  is  estimated  that  the  growth  rate  of  M1 may  be 
reduced by  as much as 3  percentage points over  the next 
year as a  result  of  the shift out of  demand  deposits  into 
automatic transfer accounts.  If  so,  measured  M1 growth 
well  under 5 per cent over the next year  may  not indicate 
that monetary deceleration  is  severe.  The behavior  of  M2 
may,  therefore,  be  a  better  measure  of  the  degree  of 
monetary deceleration  in the upcoming year. 
below the critical values that have always been 
associated  with  recessions  in  the 1952-77 
period. 
Inferences  based  on  comparison  of  the 
current  degree of  monetary  deceleration  with 
past  decelerations  must  be  interpreted  with 
caution,  however.  First,  it  is  difficult  to 
determine from the observed  relationship 
between monetary decelerations and recessions 
which  were  the  causes  and  which  were  the 
effects.  There  is  no  consensus  among 
economists  regarding  the degree  to which  the 
historical  relationship  between  monetary 
growth  and  business  cycles  results  from  the 
independent  influence  of  monetary  growth  on 
the economy. Most observers believe, however, 
that  monetary  growth  does  have  some 
independent  influence  on  the  course  of  the 
economy. 
Caution  also  must  be exercised  when  inter- 
preting the implication of  historical experience 
for  the  future  association  between  monetary 
decelerations  and  recessions.  Economic  rela- 
tionships that held in the past may not continue 
to  hold  in  the  future  if  the  economic 
environment  changes  substantially.  The  be- 
havior  of  monetary  growth  in  recent  years 
seems to have departed from the behavior that 
would  have  been  expected  from  past  relation- 
ships, indicating that a change in the economic 
environment may have  The anoma- 
lous behavior of monetary growth in the current 
economic expansion may be due in part to the 
accelerated  pace of  financial innovation. If so, 
the recent introduction of money market CD's, 
automatic  transfer  accounts,  and  other  new 
financial  assets  may  cause  a  departure  from 
past  relationships  that  makes  it  difficult  to 
24 See  Bryon  Higgins, "Velocity:  Money's  Second 
Dimension," Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Kansas City 
Economic Review,  June  1978,  for  a  more  detailed 
discussion of  the anomalous  behavior  of  monetary growth 
in the current economic expansion. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City interpret the economic significance of  declines 
in  monetary growth  rates.  Moreover,  the 
anomalous  behavior  of  monetary  growth  in 
recent years can only be partly explained by the 
introduction of new types of financial assets. To 
some  extent,  the  reason  for  this  behavior 
remains a mystery. Any analysis of  the relation- 
ship between  monetary  decelerations  and 
recessions, therefore, is  subject  to considerable 
uncertainty. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There  has  been  a  fairly  close  relationship 
between  declines  in  monetary  growth  and 
recessions.  The  historical evidence since 1952 
indicates  that  recessions  have  always  been 
accompanied  by  deceleration  in  monetary 
growth but that monetary deceleration has not 
always  been  associated  with  a  recession.  A 
procedure  was  developed  in  this  study  for 
determining the relationship between recessions 
and alternative  degrees of  monetary decelera- 
tion.  The  rules  developed  by  using  this  pro- 
cedure to analyze monetary decelerations since 
1952  indicate  that  the  recent  declines  in 
monetary growth rates have already resulted in 
an  appreciable  monetary  deceleration  of  the 
type that has sometimes, although not always, 
been  associated  with  recessions.  An  accelera- 
tion in monetary growth  would  be  required  in 
upcoming months to prevent the recent declines 
in  monetary  growth  from  becoming  a  severe 
monetary  deceleration  of  the  type  that  has 
always  been  accompanied  by  recession  since 
1952. 
The  usefulness  of  analyzing  the  past 
association between monetary decelerations and 
recessions is limited somewhat by the difficulty 
in  determining causal relationships and by  the 
potential effects of  financial innovation on  the 
association  in  the  future.  Despite  these 
limitations, however, comparison of  the relative 
degrees  of  monetary  deceleration  associated 
with  recessions in the past does  provide  useful 
information  on  the  relationship  between 
monetary  growth  and  business  cycles.  This 
information  may be  useful to policymakers  in 
assessing the implications  for  the economy  of 
the  recent  and  prospective  behavior  of  the 
monetary aggregates. 
Economic Review  April 1979 